It is a controversial issue whether in the utopia of Plato’s Rep. there should be slaves. I, for one, am not convinced by Gregory Vlastos’[1] attempts to prove the existence of slaves in that work. However, in Plato’s latest work, the Laws, there are in individual laws very specific rules laid down for slaves, although they are not to be found in a coherent, systematic inquiry that deals with all the aspects of treatment of slaves, but are scattered over the whole work and whose exact nature must at times be inferred from other regulations.
In addition to this, Plato assumes here the existence of this institution as necessary, but he did not justify the need, legitimacy, or usefulness of this institution slavery, but these are taken for granted. Thus, at 3 690B, in the ranking of the various claims to rule, in 4th place after that of older people over younger people, the claim of masters over slaves is simply mentioned.[2]
And without any justification Plato determines that slaves need the supervision of men in the same way as children need it by the boys' supervisor and animals by herdsmen (7 808d4). In Book 6 Plato does not deal in detail with property of the household, because, as he says, its understanding and acquisition offers no difficulties,[3] whereas the issue of household slaves was difficult in every way (776b, c) - slaves are a form of possession, and a rather problematic one. Here, the remark follows that for the "necessary distinction" of slave and master the creature man is not easy to handle, as frequent slave riots have proved.[4] Not the justification of slavery provides problems, it is as "necessary" not called into question, but their treatment is problematic because as members of the human race they are hard to please. The one word used to characterize an arrangement that establishes the distinction of slave and free, the attribute "necessary" obviously has the function of settling without further ado an issue where Aristotle saw the need to justify in detail that and why it is necessary that the relationship of master and slave exists.[5] The two authors approach this from different angles, Plato from the one of making a necessary distinction among humans, Aristotle from that of bringing together humans who are as different as master and slave. Yet, not only is the result the same, there is for both philosophers a necessity to have this institution.
I will briefly deal with some aspects of the treatment of slaves in Plato’s Laws before I turn to more fundamental issues. I will first address two aspects: 1st slaves as piece of property, 2nd the legal and religious principles to be observed when dealing with slaves.
The slaves Plato deals with in the Laws (most often called douloi or oiketai) are in the majority possession (6 776b5; d3) of the citizens or metics (8 846e5). Slaves of citizens would be employed mainly in agriculture (7 806d9) as this was the only occupation citizens of Magnesia were allowed to pursue. Only a small number of slaves was engaged in state functions and might well have belonged to the state. Slaves are not allowed themselves to own slaves (6 763a). As owner[6], the master has certain rights over the slaves. Legally the owner who kills his own slave, gets off lightly because only atonement is imposed (9 865d). As a piece of property a slave is covered by the laws that protect all property (11 913A). From this concept of slaves as property follows that the owner is entitled to compensation for the loss of his slaves. This applies to the case where the slave is set free by the state as a reward for especially meritorious actions (9 881c2; 11.932d3f) and the case that someone killed one’s slave unintentionally (9 865C, see 11 936c). The owner is entitled to twice the compensation if someone killed his slave in a fit of anger (9 868a5). Conversely, the master is liable for damages his slave has committed, unless the injured party was an accomplice or otherwise involved in the act (11 936c8-d2) – it is remarkable that the same provisions apply when animals do damage: there must be compensation for any damage suffered by the actions of animals and slaves.
Plato himself puts the finger on the problem that the creature man is for all practical purposes difficult to use for the necessary distinction between slave and master (6 777b5). Citizens do need slaves, but slaves being members of the human race resent this role of being a slave. There is nothing said here about slaves who, when rightly enslaved, benefit from this relationship and can be friends of their masters as in Aristotle Pol. 1 1255b12-14.[7] The problem is not made easier for Plato by the fact that the situation is not either black or white because there can be enormous differences between slaves in their behavior. In their relations towards their master, some slaves proved to be better in every aretē than brothers or sons and have saved their masters and their property,[8] but there is also the opposite experience (776d, e). These different experiences with slaves explain that they are treated differently. Those who deal with them as brutally as one treats wild animals make matters worse, because they make their souls slavish (777a) and stir up anger in them (7 793e). In this dispute (6 777b1) Plato takes the position of those who do not treat slaves as if they were wild animals, that is, he recommends to treat them humanely. It is a different issue whether the penal code in its stipulations for punishment of slaves lives up to this high standard of humane treatment, and I think there is a contradiction between goals and actual implementation.
Plato demands that one must abstain towards slaves of any form of demeaning treatment (hybris) (777c, d) – this corresponded to Athenian law (Dem. 21.47) one should commit less wrong against them than towards equals; since in dealing with those who are easily a victim of wrongdoing it becomes manifest who really values right and who doesn’t. The behavior of masters towards slaves is not only a necessity to preserve the institution of slavery and prevent unrest, but it presents an opportunity for masters to practice their ethical quality which is proven in particular in dealing with those who are weaker. Thus Plato puts at 777e the instructions for masters concerning the treatment of slaves on the same level as the rule of a tyrant and every form of rule (dynasteia) in which one rules over someone weaker - dynasteia is in 3. 680b the rule of the patriarch in the household which does not follow laws when he determines the fortune of the members of the household.
Masters who are flawless with regard to the violation of religious principles (anhosion) or justice (adikon) are capable of sowing in the slave „(the seeds) for the growth of aretē “ (777e)[9]. Plato assumes here that to a certain degree character and behavior of slaves can be formed in a positive way. By referring to justice, Plato places the behavior expected from masters towards slaves in the larger framework of the state’s legal system so that slaves can enjoy to certain degree the protection from the legal system to which their masters are subjected. Nevertheless, there are no detailed stipulations as to how slaves could initiate proceedings under the law if they feel that their rights have been violated, and there are no rights of slaves spelled out specifically, except only indirectly in stipulations for punishment of certain acts against slaves. The observation of the second norm mentioned here, the observance of religious principles (hosion) in dealing with slaves, Plato demands elsewhere, e.g. when he leaves it to the master who caught a fugitive slave to deal with him, whichever way he wants, as long as he does this what is permitted religiously (hosion, 11.914e).[10] The observance of religious norms cannot be legally enforced; by these standards the master must possess the personal qualities which make him, without external compulsion, do the right thing. We would call this system paternalistic, relying on the good will of the master, in a sort of feudal relationship.
None of this is relevant for Aristotle since in Pol. 1 where 5 chapters a re devoted to slavery he does not deal with the treatment of slaves in the way Plato does in the Laws. When Aristotle in Pol. 1 13, 1260b5[11] criticizes Plato for depriving slaves of logos (Laws 6 777e4ff.)[12] he does not do so in order to offer a piece of practical advice but he adds this critical remark at the end of his treatment of the virtues and in particular of degrees of deliberative abilities master, wife, children and slaves possess. On the other hand one of Plato’s recommendations with regard to slaves was taken over by Aristotle for his own best state: Pol. 7 10, 1330a26 „not all should have the same ethnic background,“ cf. Plat. Laws 6 777c, d.
The middle chapters of Aristotle Pol. bk. 1 are about justification of slavery, starting with the assumption of a natural union of master − slave, while revealing that such a position was not shared by all: 1.3 1253b20-23: “Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.”[13]
Since Pol. book 1 is about the household Aristotle starts with the person who is in charge of the household and asks how he gets his job done so that the members of the house can live and live well. The master of the household will need tools like every craftsman, and eventually these tools or instruments will be slaves. Here Aristotle comes up with a list of all the qualities and conditions these living, animate tools should have:
After having defined at the end of Pol. 1 4 what a slave is, Aristotle sets out in 1 5 to discuss whether a person is of such a sort by nature or not. He begins the argument by claiming that the rule of the soul over the body is despotical, in accordance with nature, and beneficial for the element which is ruled (1254b4ff.).[14] He goes on to state that the same holds true for the relationship between man and the other animals (b10) and then extends this to „all men” (b15). In other words, Aristotle extrapolates the specific relationship between soul and body within one person in order to prescribe how different people should be related to one another.
The hierarchy of soul over body was an important issue in ethical philosophy since it provided direction for men in the choices they have to make.[15] This ethical aspect is expressed by Aristotle at Pol. 1 5, 1254a39, where he states that the correct rule within a man guarantees that a person’s body does not rule his soul as is the case with bad people.[16] This concept is of course not Aristotle’s invention. In Plato Rep. 5 455b9 we read that in some men the body serves the reason while this is not the case in others, and he describes this perversion elsewhere (4 442b; 444b[17]). Making the ethically right choice can be expressed in terms of recognizing the proper hierarchy of faculties within men, in particular of soul and body in terms of being ruler or being subjected to rule. I have argued elsewhere that Aristotle in Pol. 1 5 with his concept of despotic rule of the soul over the body follows Plato’s Phaid.[18] However, here we deal with the Laws, and in this work Plato addresses quite often the relationship of soul and body. At the end of book 4, he announces as subject matter to discuss how much attention one should give to soul, body, and possessions.[19] At Leg. 10 896b10 Plato argues with some emphasis that “correctly and in a powerful way most truly we might have stated that the soul was created in us before the body, but the body second and last, with the soul ruling and the body being ruled.” Here, as ilater (or simultaneously?) n Aristotle, the ruling of the soul over the body is in accordance with nature.[20] It is well known that this concept is one thread that holds the various themes of the Laws together. It is privileged by its distinctive place at the very end of the Laws where Plato argues that accepting the truth of this relationship is the prerequisite in order to be religious, theosebēs.[21] Laws book 5 starts by placing the just announced topic of how much attention one should give to soul, body, and possessions into the context of the previous discussion which was on the gods, and now Plato identifies after the gods the soul as the most divine thing one possesses. Among one’s possessions he distinguishes the stronger and better as despotic ruler which one needs to prefer in one’s honor over things that serve like slaves (726a-727a2).[22]
That the soul rules over the body despotically was the starting point for Aristotle in Pol. I 5 from which he proceeded to extrapolate these two faculties onto different persons who represent either of these two faculties. This is a step we don’t find yet in Plato’s Laws. So there seems to be in Plato a disconnect between the despotic rule of soul over body which we find so often expressed one the one hand and the rule of master over slave which is the basis of his concept of society on the other hand whereas in Aristotle’s Pol. book I exactly this connection is established, so much so that the former, the despotic rule of soul over body, serves as the basis to argue for the latter, the rule of master over slave. Is therefore, in spite of the agreement on despotic rule of the soul over the body in both Plato’s Laws and Aristotle’s Pol. the relationship between these two texts and their conceptual argument rather flimsy or even nonexistent? This might quite be the case, except for one very important point of agreement. There is one aspect which seems to me relevant in this context where I see a common attitude towards despotic rule.
One pivotal argument in Aristotle’s justification of slavery we find in the chapter in which he discusses the view of those who deny the right to enslave men who were defeated in war to those who defeated them. Assuming that superiority in war is based on virtue Aristotle counters:
“the views that what is superior in virtue ought not to rule or be master have neither any foundation nor convincing power.”[23] In positive terms this means: what is superior in virtue ought to rule and be master.
To the sophist Gorgias Plat. (Men. 73c7-9) ascribes the view that aretē is the ability to rule.[24] This does not seem to be very different from what Aristotle made the center of his argument against a form of slavery that is merely and brutally based on force, however, in one aspect there is a huge difference. Gorgias according to Plato Men. talked about an ability, a qualification, and this was in line with what we know elsewhere about this sophist who wanted to teach young men to be successful in politics. Gorgias’ students would appear to be qualified to succeed in politics in a democratic society. What we read in Aristotle Pol. 1.6 instead is a claim that what is superior is entitled to rule. Instead of dealing with a quality that provides a better chance to be elected to office on the basis of qualification Aristotle expresses a universally valid principle that superior quality must rule. One could understand this either in a weaker way that is more removed from practical application and does not state more than an abstract requirement for the quality of the master in a despotic relationship, or one could read this in a stricter way as a principle that should be enforced so that those considered to be inferior need to be subjected to slavery. That the latter understanding is correct is obvious from the fact that Aristotle considers hunting or war as legitimate ways to acquire slaves.
Did Aristotle invent the more radical and aggressive view that men who are superior should rule while those inferior have to obey? We find a number of such voices before Aristotle. He quoted Eur. for the view that the Greek should rule over the barbarians (Pol. 1.2 1252b8). The Athenian historian Thucydides narrates that such a view was expressed by the Athenians in the Melian dialogue (5.105.2) when they urged the Melians to surrender:
“Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to implement it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.” This principle is not called “just” but it still points into this direction since it is called a “law.” The Athenians sailed to the East in order to subject a weaker state and while doing so enslaved all those whom they did not kill. Was this an acceptable action? At least at the end of the Peloponnesian war when they learned that the Spartans had won the decisive battle and were expected to enter Athens, the Athenians were full of fear, afraid they might suffer what they had done to the Melians – they discovered the golden rule pretty late.
In more general terms such a view is presented by the interlocutor Callicles of the Platonic Gorgias. Callicles justified the claim to rule of those who are stronger by reference to a universal fact as evidenced by animals and international relations. Socrates responds by questioning the identification of better (beltiōn) and stronger (kreittōn) (488b8ff.). He puts exactly the finger on the moral problem when he asks for clarification about whether Callicles actually believes 488c4-6 “that large cities attack small ones according to what is just by nature since they are better and stronger.”[25] In the dialogue Gorgias this issue is not really decided because it takes a different turn when Socrates argues that he is the only true politician since he wants to make the citizens better. However, Callicles’ view is provocative since he questions in democratic Athens the official view which considers men as equals whereas for Callicles they were not equal and he hoped that someone would stand up and remove the unnatural conditions of equality and restore the rule of thee stronger. Even by modern standards, Callicles views are considered provocative, and that is why they appealed to Nietzsche. We find a late eächo and answer of this early debate in Plat. Leg. 5. 726a4: “What is stronger and better rules despotically while what is weaker and inferior serves as slaves.”[26]
This is carefully worded since it avoids the identification which Callicles undertook by making two separate conditions: not only stronger but better as well, and if we want to we could understand the word “and” (καὶ) as having a limiting force and say more specifically: the stronger if at the same time better rules despotically while what is weaker if at the same time inferior serves as slave. This is one aspect in which Socrates differs from Callicles, but the other aspect, the aggressive position of Callicles that inferiors are rightly subjects of the stronger, has been fully adopted. It has been made more palatable by adding the qualifications of “better” or “inferior” but the claim that these stronger and better should rule, and even rule despotically – something not even Callicles demanded – remains valid. One could call this the oppressive or “supremacist nature” of virtue, and it leads in Plato not only to the often metaphorical use of the master slave relationship but one that is binding for the real world, between people, as well: Leg. 3 690b7 “The fourth (principle is) that slaves are being ruled whereas masters rule.”[27] And Plato considers the distinction between free persons and slaves a necessity. There is in the argument of Plato’s Laws more that provides a justification of slavery on psychological and ethical grounds as Aristotle will develop it than the silence on this matter in Laws book 6 reveals.
Bibliography:
BEN GURION, D.: Platon et l´esclavage, in: Évidences 9 (1957) 25-34.
BERTRAND, J.-M.: Sur le statut des esclaves dans la cité des Magnètes: fictions juridiques et pouvoir politique. In: F. L. Lisi (Hrsg.) Plato's Laws and its Historical Significance: Selected Papers of the I International Congress on Ancient Thought Salamanca 1998. Sankt Augustin 2001 193-199.
GARNSEY, P.: Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine. Cambridge 1996.
GUALTIERI, P.: L’uomo come macchina: note sul pensiero di Platone e di Aristotele sulla schiavitù. Palermo 1983.
KLEES, H. : Herren und Sklaven. Die Sklaverei im oikonomischen und politischen Schrifttum der Griechen in klassischer Zeit. Wiesbaden 1975. (FAS 6).
MEITAL, A. - AGASSI, J.: Slaves in Plato's Laws. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2007) 315-347.
MILANI, P. A.: La schiavitù nel pensiero politico: dai Greci al basso medio evo. Milano 1972.
MORROW, G. R.: Plato’s Law of Slavery in its Relation to Greek Law. Urbana 1939.
RÄDLE, H.:Platons Freigelassenengesetze als Ausdruck attischer Standespolitik des 4. Jahrhunderts. In: Gymnasium 79 (1972) 305-313.
SAUNDERS, T.: Plato’s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology. Oxford 1991.
SCHÜTRUMPF, E.: Slaves in Plato’s Political Dialogues and the Significance of Plato’s Psychology for the Aristotelian Theory of Slavery. In: W. Detel; A. Becker; P. Scholz (Edd.): Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato. Stuttgart 2003, 246-260 (now in: SCHÜTRUMPF; E.: Praxis und Lexis. Ausgewählte Schriften zur Philosophie von Handeln und Reden in der klassischen Antike. Stuttgart 2009, 65-79.
VLASTOS, G.: Does Slavery exist in Plato’s Republic? In: ClPh 63 (1968) 291-295 (now in VLASTOS, G.: Platonic Studies. Princeton ²1981, 140-146).
© E.
[1] Gregory Vlastos, „Does Slavery exist in Plato's Republic?“ CPh 63 (1968) 291-295 (repr. in: G.V., Platonic Studies, 2Princeton 1981, 140-146)
[2] Plat. Leg. 3 690b7 “The fourth (principle is) that slaves are ruled whereas masters rule.” Τέταρτον δ’ αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.
[3] Plato Laws 7. 776b, c Κτήματα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῖα ἄν τις κεκτημένος ἐμμελεστάτην οὐσίαν κεκτῇτο; τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ οὔτε νοῆσαι χαλεπὸν οὔτε κτήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκετῶν χαλεπὰ πάντῃ.
[4] 777b4 Τί δ’, ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ δεσπότην, οὐδαμῶς εὔχρηστον ἐθέλειν εἶναί τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται, χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα·
[5] Arist. Pol. 1.2 1252a26f., 30-34 ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον ... ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον [ταῦτα] τῷ σώματι πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον· 5 1254b15.
[6] This term Leg. 9 882b5.
[7] Aristotle Pol. 1.6 1255b12 διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἠξιωμένοις ...
[8] Why are they then slaves? Aristotle, with all the problems of his justification of slavery, requires slaves to be a group with similar qualities, and aretē, is not one of them, Pol. 1.5-6; 13.
[9] Plato Laws 7.777e ὁ περὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων οὖν ἤθη καὶ πράξεις γιγνόμενός τις ἀμίαντος τοῦ τε ἀνοσίου πέρι καὶ ἀδίκου, σπείρειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν ἱκανώτατος ἂν εἴη, ταὐτὸν δ’ ἔστ’ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἅμα λέγοντα ἐπί τε δεσπότῃ καὶ τυράννῳ καὶ πᾶσαν δυναστείαν δυναστεύοντι πρὸς ἀσθενέστερον ἑαυτοῦ.
[10] 11. 914e Ἀγέτω τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δοῦλον ὁ βουλόμενος, ἐὰν ἔμφρων ᾖ, χρησόμενος ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τῶν ὁπόσα ὅσια·
[11] Arist. Pol. 1. 13 1260b5 διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.
[12] Plato Laws 777e4ff. κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ, καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν· τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν ἐπίταξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι, μὴ προσπαίζοντας μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς οἰκέταις, μήτ’ οὖν θηλείαις μήτε ἄρρεσιν, ἃ δὴ πρὸς δούλους φιλοῦσι πολλοὶ σφόδρα ἀνοήτως θρύπτοντες χαλεπώτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸν βίον ἐκείνοις τε ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἄρχειν.
[13] Arist. Pol. 1.3 1253b20-23: τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν (νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δ’ ἐλεύθερoν, φύσει δ’ οὐθὲν διαφέρειν)• διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον• βίαιον γάρ.
[14] Arist. Pol. 1.5 1254b4ff. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν ἢ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς “The soul rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a political and royal rule. And it is clear that its is natural and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul and for the irrational element by reason.”
[15] Plat. Leg. 3 697bff., 5 743e; cf. Phil. 48e; Arist. EE 2 1, 1218b32 (referring to his exoterikoi logoi); 6 8, 1098b12; Pol. 7 1, 1323a25ff. (referring to his exoterikoi logoi).
[16] 1254a39 διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν.
[17] Plat. Rep. 4. 444b Oὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν’ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δ’ οὐ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα οἶμαι φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τήν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν.
[18] Plat. Phaid. 79e8-80a9 ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· „nature orders the body to be slave and to be ruled despotically, and the soul to rule and to be master.” See Schütrumpf,: Slaves in Plato’s Political Dialogues and the Significance of Plato’s Psychology for the Aristotelian Theory of Slavery. In: W. Detel; A. Becker; P. Scholz (Edd.): Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato. Stuttgart 2003, 246-260 (now in: Schütrumpf, E.: Praxis und Lexis. Ausgewählte Schriften zur Philosophie von Handeln und Reden in der klassischen Antike. Stuttgart 2009, 65-79.
[19] Plato Laws 4 724a7 Ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς χρὴ τὰ περὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας σπουδῆς τε πέρι καὶ ἀνέσεως ἴσχειν, προσῆκόν τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ κοινότατον ἀναπεμπαζομένους τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας παιδείας γίγνεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπηβόλους·
[20] Leg. 10 896b10 Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἶμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. “correctly and in a decisive way most truly we might have stated that the soul was created in us before the body, but the body second and last, with the soul ruling and the the body being ruled in accordance with nature.”
[21] 12 967 {ΑΘ.} Οὐκ ἔστιν ποτὲ γενέσθαι βεβαίως θεοσεβῆ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ταῦτα νῦν δύο λάβῃ, ψυχή τε ὡς ἔστιν πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν, ἀθάνατόν τε, ἄρχει τε δὴ σωμάτων πάντων-
[22] 5 726 Ἀκούοι δὴ πᾶς ὅσπερ νυνδὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν τε ἤκουε καὶ τῶν φίλων προπατόρων· πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν. τὰ δ’ αὑτοῦ διττὰ πάντ’ ἐστὶ πᾶσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χείρω δοῦλα· τῶν οὖν αὑτοῦ τὰ δεσπόζοντα ἀεὶ προτιμητέον τῶν δουλευόντων. οὕτω δὴ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας δεσπότας καὶ τοὺς τούτοις ἑπομένους τιμᾶν δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν, ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι, cf. Plato Laws 10. 892 a8 παντὸς μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ταῦτα οὕτως, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης γ’ αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος; ταῦτ’ ἔσθ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, cf. V 743e1 διὸ δὴ χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν οὐχ ἅπαξ εἰρήκαμεν ὡς χρὴ τελευταῖον τιμᾶν• ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἁπάντων περὶ ἃ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει, τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς; 9. 870b2 τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦ πλούτου κατὰ πόλεις πάσας πάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον, ὡς ἕνεκα σώματός ἐστι, καὶ σῶμα ψυχῆς ἕνεκα•; 10 959a4 πείθεσθαι δ’ ἐστὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ χρεὼν τά τε ἄλλα καὶ λέγοντι ψυχὴν σώματος (5) εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν, ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ βίῳ τὸ παρεχόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦτ’ εἶναι μηδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν ψυχήν, (b.) τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἰνδαλλόμενον ἡμῶν ἑκάστοις ἕπεσθαι, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἴδωλα εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως, ἀθάνατον εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, cf. Arist. EN 10. 10
[23] Arist. Pol. 1.6 1255a20: οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.
[24] Σωκράτης ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.
Μένων τί ἄλλο γ᾽ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
[25] Callicles in Plat. Gorgias asked by Socrates (488c4-6) ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι.
[26] Plat. Leg. 5. 726a4 “What is stronger and better rules despotically while what is weaker and inferior serves as slaves.” τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χείρω δοῦλα. This is metaphorical since it applies to conditions within man.
[27] Plat. Leg. 3 690b7 “The fourth (principle is) that slaves are ruled whereas masters rule.” Τέταρτον δ’ αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.
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